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Leibniz and the Puzzle of Incompossibility: The Packing Strategy 
Jeffrey K. McDonough 
Harvard University 
 
0.  Introduction 
 
Leibniz famously maintains that God has created the best of all possible worlds.  Not 
surprisingly, it is often objected that other possible worlds seem better and so that a 
benevolent, all-powerful God should have created a different world instead.  But there is in 
some ways a more fundamental difficulty facing Leibniz’s modal ontology:  even granting 
that this is the best of all possible worlds, and that God has done something good in creating 
it, why doesn’t God instantiate other possible worlds as well.  Why, that is, doesn’t he create 
not only the best of all possible worlds, but also the second best, the third best, etc.?
 1  After 
all, Leibniz maintains that existence itself is good, and seems committed to the view that no 
substance per se entails the existence or non-existence of any other substance.  It appears to 
follow that a wholly good and omnipotent God should want – and be able – to create 
together every possible substance, and in doing so every possible world.  But that, it seems, 
would leave no unrealized possibilities, and thus no alternatives to what God actually creates.  
In this way, as in so many others, Leibniz’s commitments appear to push him towards a 
Spinozistic necessitarianism that he was anxious to avoid.
2   
In response to this particular version of the threat of Spinozism, Leibniz suggests 
that not all possible substances are compossible – that they can’t all be created together – 
and thus that not all possible worlds are compossible – that they can’t all be created together.    2 
But while Leibniz’s reasons for insisting on the incompossiblity of substances are clear 
enough, how such a response might be reconciled with the broader commitments of his 
philosophical system remains obscure.  What is needed, most specifically, is an account of 
how Leibniz might avoid falling into the trap of necessitarianism, while preserving his 
commitment to the per se independence of created substances and the traditional doctrine of 
the equivalence of being and goodness.   
The following four main sections develop an overlooked strategy for solving the 
“puzzle of incompossibility.”  The first section frames the puzzle more carefully and briefly 
argues that the two dominant strategies developed by Leibniz’s commentators fail to solve it 
fully insofar as they require abandoning one or another of the theses that motivate it.  The 
second section highlights an alternative strategy suggested by Leibniz’s guiding analogy of a 
finite geometrical packing or tiling problem.  The third section shows how that strategy 
might be applied to solve the puzzle of incompossibility in the context of infinite worlds 
composed of extended corporeal substances.  Finally, the fourth section shows how the 
strategy of Leibniz’s packing analogy might be applied even in the context of a thoroughly 
idealist metaphysics in which the only true substances are non-extended, mind-like 
“monads.”  The essay concludes by drawing some connections between Leibniz’s thinking 
about the puzzle of incompossibility and the development of his views concerning the status 
of corporeal substances. 
 
1.  The Puzzle of Incompossibility  
 
The puzzle of incompossibility arises most directly in Leibniz’s philosophy from the 
intersection of three central theses.  What we might call the thesis of maximization suggests   3 
that God creates as much being as he can – that he literally maximizes existence.  Thus, for 
example, in a suggestive piece from quite early in his career (1676), Leibniz writes: 
After due consideration I take as a principle the harmony of things:  that is, that the 
greatest amount of essence that can exist, does exist.  It follows that there is more 
reason for existing than not existing, and that all things will exist, if that can come 
about.  For since something exists, and all possibles cannot exist, it follows that 
those things exist which contain the most essence, for there is no other reason for 
choosing some and excluding the rest.  (A.VI.iii.472/DSR 21-2; cf. G VII 302-8/L 
486-491; G I 331/L 211; G VII 290/RM 9-10) 
Although Leibniz’s commitment to maximization might seem somewhat surprising today, it is 
strongly encouraged by two once widely held doctrines that Leibniz also accepts:  on the one 
hand, that God is wholly good and omnipotent, and, on the other hand, that reality or being 
is in some sense identical – or “convertible” – with the good.
3  For if being itself is good, 
then it seems that a wholly good divinity ought to strive to create as much being as it can, 
and if that divinity is also omnipotent, it seems that he ought to be able to create as much 
being as his nature allows.     
The second thesis – what we might call the thesis of independence – is likewise rooted 
in a deeply traditional view, namely, that a substance is a being that exists “in itself (in se) and 
by itself (per se).”
 4  In discussing this traditional scholastic formula, Jorge Gracia helpfully 
explains:  
It . . . meant that a substance was, from its own essence, independent, i.e. that it did 
not receive its being except through its own essence or form.  Of course, all 
substances are in one way or another dependent on other substances for their 
efficient causation, and, according to scholastics, on God for their creation.  But for   4 
their formal causation they do not depend on anything else, since there is no 
reference to other substances or beings in their definition.  In this way they differ 
from accidents which are always defined in terms of another and, therefore, are 
dependent [per se] on something else.
5 (268)
  
The independence thesis thus insists that one created substance cannot depend per se upon 
another created substance – that, if you like, it cannot be written into the formal nature or 
essence of a created substance that it can only exist with or without some other created 
substance.  Importantly, independence in this sense leaves open the possibility that one 
substance might nonetheless be dependent upon another substance per accidens.  The plants in 
my garden, for example, are dependent per accidens upon me as an efficient cause, and upon 
the soil as a material cause, as well as upon the absence of weeds and arsenic that would kill 
them.  Nonetheless, the plants are formally distinct from these things, and all other created 
substances, and are thus independent per se in the relevant sense.
6   
Although the notion that a created substance must be independent per se was widely 
held by Leibniz’s predecessors and contemporaries, he shows an especially keen interest in 
drawing out the consequences of this traditional doctrine, and it serves as the driving force 
behind many of his most important and familiar metaphysical commitments.  Thus, for 
example, it may be seen as the motivation behind the familiar Leibnizian doctrines that 
substances are individuated by their internal features, that relations between substances 
supervene on their (cognized) intrinsic properties, and that to each genuine substance there 
corresponds a complete concept containing only monadic predicates.  It is captured 
succinctly by Leibniz’s claim that “each substance is like a world apart, independent of all 
other things, except for God” (DM 14/AG 47).
7   5 
The third thesis – what we might call the thesis of alternatives – insists that God’s free 
creation presupposes his recognition of different possible worlds.  This thesis is of particular 
importance for Leibniz insofar as he sees it as essential for resisting the threat of a 
Spinozistic necessitarianism.  Thus, in a short piece entitled “On Freedom,” tentatively dated 
to 1689, Leibniz tells us: 
. . . I was [once] very close to the view of those who think that everything is 
absolutely necessary, who judge that it is enough for freedom that we be uncoerced, 
even though we might be subject to necessity, and close to the view of those who do 
not distinguish what is infallible or certainly known to be true, from that which is 
necessary.   
  But the consideration of possibles, which are not, were not, and will not be, 
brought me back from this precipice.  For if there are certain possibles that never 
exist, then the things that exist, at any rate, are not always necessary, for otherwise it 
would be impossible for others to exist in their place, and thus, everything that never 
exists would be impossible.  (A VI.iv.1653-54/AG 94).  
Similarly, in his fifth letter to Samuel Clarke (ca. 1716), Leibniz writes:  
[W]hen a wise being, and especially God, who has supreme wisdom, chooses what is 
best, he is not the less free upon that account:  on the contrary, it is the most perfect 
liberty, not to be hindered from acting in the best manner. . . . But if what he 
chooses was absolutely necessary; any other way would be impossible:  which is 
against the hypothesis.  For God chooses among possibles, that is, among many 
ways, none of which implies a contradiction.  (G VII 390/Alexander 56-7) 
Leibniz is willing to allow that God chooses to instantiate the best of all possible worlds 
through a sort of moral determination:  given the goodness of his character, it is inevitable   6 
that God chooses to create the best, and we may therefore be morally certain that this is the 
best of all possible worlds.  Nonetheless, Leibniz insists that God’s freedom requires there to 
be alternatives to the actual world (AG 242-43/A II.i.501-2).   
The difficulty presented by the puzzle of incompossibility can be located in the fact 
that, although Leibniz appears to be deeply committed to the theses maximization, independence 
and alternatives, it is not at all clear that they form a consistent triad.  One might, for example, 
reconcile maximization and independence by supposing that God creates every possible 
substance, and thereby every possible world; but this would seem to contradict the thesis of 
alternatives since it would seem to leave no possibility unrealized.  Likewise, one might 
reconcile independence and alternatives by supposing that, although God could create every 
possible substance, and thereby every possible world, he limits himself to creating some 
subset of possible substances; but this suggestion seems quite clearly to violate Leibniz’s 
commitment to maximization.  Finally, one might reconcile maximization and alternatives by 
supposing that God strives to create as much being as he can, but that substances are related 
to one another by their formal natures in such a way that the creation of one substance 
might per se entail the creation or non-creation of another substance.  But this strategy, 
insofar as it relies on substances being formally or per se dependent upon one another, would 
clearly contradict the thesis of independence.     
The two standard responses to the puzzle of incompossibility offered by Leibniz’s 
commentators have proceeded by effectively abandoning one or another of his three 
commitments.  What has been called the logical approach
8 to the puzzle of incompossibility 
insists that not all substances are compossible because at least some substances are related to 
one another by their formal natures or essences in such way that their co-creation would 
involve an immediate logical contradiction.
 9  Indeed, in following out this strategy, it has   7 
typically been suggested that, for Leibniz, each substance must be “world-bound” in such a 
way that it can, by its essential nature, only be created with all and only its world-mates.
 10  
This approach to the problem, of course, preserves well enough the theses of maximization 
and alternatives since it implies that in creating the best of all possible worlds, God might 
thereby be precluded from creating other possible worlds on pain of violating the laws of 
logic.  Unfortunately, it would straightforwardly undermine Leibniz’s commitment to the 
thesis of independence since it also implies that every creaturely substance depends per se upon 
every other creaturely substance with which it is compossible.  The logical approach thus 
does not really show how Leibniz’s three theses might be reconciled, but rather suggests 
abandoning one of them in particular.   
What has been called the lawful approach to the puzzle of incompossibility takes a 
very different tack.  It grants that, strictly speaking, all substances for Leibniz are 
compossible per se, but nonetheless insists that two substances may be incompossible on the 
hypothesis that they belong to a world governed by suitably harmonious laws.
11  The 
intuitive picture here is that God could, without logical contradiction, create any collection 
of substances, including the limiting cases of any single substance as a “world apart,” or all 
substances together in a maximally inclusive “super-world.”  Nonetheless, it insists that not 
all substances are compossible in the sense that not all collections of substances would be 
suitably harmonious – an incompossibile collection of substances might, for example, fail to 
intelligibly ground laws of mutual expression, or principles of continuity, or representations 
of causal, temporal and spatial interaction.
12  In allowing that substances are not dependent 
upon one another per se, the lawful approach does better by the thesis of independence than the 
logical approach, and in suggesting a basis for the partitioning of worlds, it points towards an 
interesting way of accommodating alternatives.  Nonetheless, these gains are accomplished at   8 
the cost of undermining Leibniz’s commitment to maximization since the lawful approach 
suggests that God fails to create as much being as he can.  Thus, at the end of the day, the 
lawful solution, like the logical solution, does not really show how Leibniz’s three 
commitments might be genuinely reconciled, but rather commends abandoning one of them 
in particular. 
The challenge presented by the puzzle of incompossibility is formidable, and it is 
tempting to suppose that it cannot be met even in principle – that Leibniz simply must give 
up at least one of maximization, independence, or alternatives.  The aim of the next three sections 
is to develop three possible lines of response to the puzzle of incompossibility that take 
advantage of different constraints suggested by Leibniz’s own analogies and metaphysical 
commitments.  To anticipate somewhat, the next section will argue that the challenge 
presented by the puzzle of incompossibility meets its most straightforward response under 
the constraints implied by Leibniz’s own intuitive packing analogies, that is, under the 
constraints that the world must have a finite volume and be filled with extended corporeal 
substances.  Under those conditions, it is relatively easy to see how Leibniz may hold that no 
world might contain every possible substance even if no two substances are incompossible 
per se.  The section following the next will then argue that the challenge posed by the puzzle 
of incompossibility can also be met if the restriction to finite worlds is removed but the 
assumption of corporeal substances is preserved.  Under those circumstances, Leibniz must 
admit that there is a world containing every possible substance, but he may still deny that 
that world must be the best of all possible worlds since there may be other “infinite” worlds 
that not only contain an infinite amount of perfection, but are also more “densely” packed 
with created being in their local sub-regions.  Finally, the last main section takes up the 
challenge presented by the puzzle of incompossibility with both the restriction to finite   9 
worlds and the assumption of corporeal substances removed.  It will be argued that under 
those circumstances, the thesis of independence commits Leibniz to the existence of a world 
containing every possible substance, and the thesis of maximization commits him to 
identifying that world as the best of all possible worlds.  Nonetheless, even allowing that the 
best of all possible worlds contains every possible substance, Leibniz may still uphold the 
thesis of alternatives since the compossibility of all possible substances needn’t entail the 
compossibility of all possible worlds, and since in creating the best of all possible worlds 
God might leave unrealized infinitely many inferior possibilities.    
    
2.  Leibniz’s Packing Strategy and Finite Corporeal Worlds 
 
Although variations on the logical and lawful approaches have long dominated the secondary 
literature, Leibniz’s own response to the puzzle of incompossibility seems to be anchored in 
an analogy that prima facie suggests a very different strategy.
13  The analogy – to which 
Leibniz returns throughout his career – is nicely articulated in a well-known passage from On 
the Radical Origination of Things (1697):    
[I]t is obvious that of the infinite combinations of possibilities and possible series, 
the one that exists is the one through which the most essence or possibility is 
brought into existence. . . . the situation is like that in certain games, in which all 
places on the board are supposed to be filled in accordance with certain rules, where 
at the end, blocked by certain spaces, you will be forced to leave more places empty 
than you could have or wanted to, unless you used some trick.  There is, however, a 
certain procedure through which one can most easily fill the board. . . . And so, 
assuming that at some time being is to prevail over nonbeing, or that there is a   10 
reason why something rather than nothing is to exist, or that something is to pass 
from possibility to actuality, although nothing beyond this is determined, it follows 
that there would be as much as there possibly can be, given the capacity of time and 
space (that is, the capacity of the order of possible existence); in a word, it is just like 
tiles laid down so as to contain as many as possible in a given area.  (G VII 303-
4/AG 150-1; cf.  DM 5/G IV 430; A VI.iv.1396/LOC 239; A VI.iv.1616-17/LOC 
305; A VI.iv.1399/LOC 246-7;A.VI.iii.472/LOC 45; G VII 290/RM 9)    
Leibniz’s geometrical “packing” or “tiling” analogy does little to suggest either the logical or 
lawful responses to the puzzle of incompossibility that have been favored by his 
commentators.  For in it there is no hint that the existence of one substance might per se 
entail the existence or non-existence of any other particular substance.  Indeed, the analogy 
might reasonably be read as suggesting just the opposite, for it implies that one collection of 
tiles might, as a matter of fact and per accidens, preclude another collection of tiles without any 
one tile per se entailing or excluding any other tile.  Nor is there any suggestion that 
considerations of maximization and order must be traded off against one another as the 
lawful solution suggests.  Indeed, again, just the opposite:  in the packing analogy it is the 
optimal ordering that leads to the inclusion of the most tiles; the peak of harmony and the 
peak of fecundity are presented as being mutually supportive not mutually exclusive.  Thus, 
echoing the analogy above, Leibniz tells us, “God makes the most things he can and what 
obliges him to seek simple laws is the need to find a place for as many things as can be put 
together; if he made use of other laws, it would be like trying to make a building with round 
stones, which make us lose more space than they occupy” (G I 331/L211; cf. A.VI.iii.587-
88; G VI 241/H 257).
14     11 
If Leibniz’s packing analogy seems to point away from both the logical and lawful 
approaches to the puzzle of incompossibility, it is less clear what positive solution – or 
solutions – it might be thought to point towards.  As a first step in fleshing out the intuitive 
strategy of the packing analogy, it should therefore be helpful to see how it might be 
developed under a pair of simplifying assumptions, namely, that (i) creation involves the 
realization of extended, corporeal substances, and (ii) is finite in both total volume and 
number of constituents.  The first assumption suggests, of course, that the packing analogy 
might be taken rather literally, with extended substances spatially excluding one another, and 
filling up measurable volumes.
15  The second assumption is intended to hold at bay, for now, 
complications arising specifically from the possibility of infinite collections, which might be 
realized either by allowing that the total volume of the world could be infinite, or by granting 
that extended substances could be either infinitely small or converge through an infinite 
series to a finite volume.
16   
With both simplifying assumptions in place, it should be clear that two 
considerations in particular will be relevant in considering whether or not a specific 
substance is created.  The first will be the substance’s degree of perfection, or, by the 
convertibility of the good, its degree of being.  We may suppose that, all things considered, 
God chooses to create substances that are more perfect over substances that are less perfect.  
In this regard, it is worth noting that one shouldn’t imagine that a substance’s degree of 
perfection must be directly proportional to its gross size or volume.  For it might easily be 
the case that a tiny creature may have a much greater amount of perfection than a relatively 
large creature – a small child, for example, might be far more perfect than an enormous 
whale.     12 
The second consideration that will be relevant in considering whether or not a 
specific substance is created will be what we might call its “packing cost.”  The packing cost 
of a substance will be a measure of the extent to which it precludes the existence of other 
creatures.  Again, we may suppose that, all things considered, God chooses to create 
substances that have a lower packing cost over substances with a higher packing cost.  And, 
in regards to this consideration, it is worth noting that a substance’s packing cost likewise 
needn’t be directly proportional to its gross size or volume.  For a relatively large creature 
might fit into a world better than a relatively small creature in much the way that my rain suit 
packs in my travel bag better than my umbrella even though its gross volume is strictly 
speaking greater.  Furthermore, and relatedly, a substance’s packing cost will typically have to 
be measured relative to a set of substances.  For a particular substance might have a high 
packing cost relative to one set of substances and a low packing cost relative to another set, 
just as my umbrella packs poorly with my books, but well with my golf clubs.
17   
The considerations of intrinsic perfection and packing cost might, of course, pull in 
opposite directions.  A substance with a higher packing cost might therefore be preferred 
over a substance with a lower packing cost on the basis of its higher degree of perfection, 
just as a less perfect creature might be preferred to a more perfect creature because it does 
less to exclude the existence of other creatures.  Thus, Leibniz notes: 
Although the more perfect may occasionally be excluded by the more imperfect, 
nevertheless all in all that way of creating the world is chosen which involves more 
reality or perfection, and God acts like a first-rate geometer who prefers the best 
constructions of problems.  Thus all beings . . . have, in addition to bare possibility, 
some propensity for existing in proportion to their goodness; and, if God wills it, do 
exist, unless they are incompatible with more perfect beings, or with a greater   13 
number of beings.  The latter occurs if they have too great a volume in proportion to 
their potential, so that they occupy more space than they fill, like angular or sinuous 
things.  (A VI.iv.1616-17/LOC 305) 
God’s decision concerning which possible creatures to actualize thus turns out to be not so 
different from the more mundane decision one faces in considering what items to take on a 
trip.  In much the way that my decision to pack my umbrella will depend not only on its 
value to me, but also on what items it would preclude me from packing and their value to 
me, God’s decision concerning whether or not to create a particular substance will take into 
account not only its intrinsic perfection, but also the implications that the creation of that 
substance would have with respect to the creation of every other possible substance.  The 
best of all possible worlds will accordingly be the world that instantiates the most efficient 
packing of substances under the stated constraints; it will be the world that is optimally 
“stuffed” full of corporeal substances taking into consideration each possible substance’s 
own perfection as well as how it fits together with every other possible substance.   
Leibniz’s original packing strategy suggests an intuitive – if still preliminary – 
response to the puzzle of incompossility that promises to reconcile all three of its driving 
commitments.  The thesis of maximization will be satisfied as long as there is a uniquely best 
possible “packing” of creation, and God chooses to instantiate that packing.  The former is 
guaranteed for Leibniz by the fact God chooses to create at all, and the latter by Leibniz’s 
optimism (e.g. DM 22/AG 54-55; Mon 53/AG 220).  The thesis of independence may 
nonetheless be preserved since nothing in the analogy requires the postulation of an illicit per 
se dependence between any two created substances.  Leibniz may hold that, for any two 
substances A and B, as far as their formal natures are concerned, A may exist with or 
without B, and B may exist with or without A (cf. AT VIIIA 18/CSM 1:213).  Finally, the   14 
model of creation presented by the finite packing analogy suggests a straightforward way in 
which the thesis of alternatives might be maintained.  For if not all possible substances can be 
fitted into a given finite volume, then God will confront different possible ways in which the 
world might be constituted, with different sets of possible substances representing different 
solutions to the implicit packing problem.  By showing how God might be confronted with 
such alternatives, the finite packing analogy provides Leibniz with an especially intuitive way 
to distinguish his own position from the necessitarianism of Spinoza without falling foul of 
his various other metaphysical and theological commitments.   
 
3.  Leibniz’s Packing Strategy and Infinite Corporeal Worlds 
 
In beginning to work out the strategy implicit in Leibniz’s packing analogy, we relied on two 
important assumptions.  The first assumption, concerning Leibniz’s commitment to the 
existence of extended corporeal substances, has become a topic of intense debate among his 
commentators.  Although the issue is far from decided, it now seems likely that Leibniz 
believed in the existence of extended bodies or substances early in his career, and that it is at 
least plausible that he continued to be committed to them well into his so-called “middle 
years” and perhaps even longer.
18  The second assumption cannot, however, be said to enjoy 
even such qualified support since Leibniz explicitly embraces the actually infinite, dismissing, 
for example, Descartes’s cautious “indefinite” divisibility of bodies in favor of the view that 
matter is “really divided by motion into parts that are smaller than any assignable, and 
therefore actually infinite” and positively affirming that “[t]here is no possible reason, that 
can limit the quantity of matter; and therefore such limitations can have no place” 
(A.VI.iii.214/LOC 25; G VII 374/Alexander 39-40 [section 21]; cf. A.VI.ii.264/LOC 339; G   15 
III 304-5; G VII 374/Alexander 40 [section 22]).  As a next step in fleshing out the strategy 
of Leibniz’s packing analogy, we might therefore consider how it might be applied while 
maintaining the first simplifying assumption and abandoning the second; that is, we might 
consider how it might be applied in the context of a metaphysics of infinite worlds 
composed of extended corporeal substances.     
The attempt to extend Leibniz’s analogy in this way meets with two principal 
obstacles.  The first concerns how the relative perfection of worlds is to be determined.  
Once it is allowed that worlds might be infinite, it will no longer do to assume that their 
relative perfection might be measured by simply summing the perfections of their 
constituent substances.  For, by such a measurement, most infinite worlds might well turn 
out to have an infinite amount of perfection.
19  So, for example, assuming that even a 
starfish has some finite amount of perfection, it might turn out that a world containing 
nothing but infinitely many starfish will have an infinite amount of perfection, and, indeed, 
the same amount of perfection as, say, a world containing nothing but infinitely many 
primates.  Measuring the perfection of infinite worlds by simple summation might thus yield 
not simply an unhelpful, or implausible determination of the relative perfections of worlds, 
but – what’s worse from the perspective of divine choice – the disastrous result that there 
might be infinitely many equally perfect infinite worlds. 
Fortunately, there is an intuitive way of addressing this first obstacle suggested by 
Leibniz’s own insistence on the world’s being not merely infinite, but everywhere packed full 
of organisms within organisms to infinity (e.g. G II 118).  For it seems reasonable to 
suppose that infinite extended worlds should not be compared on the basis of simply 
summing the perfections of their constituent members, but rather on the basis of something 
more like their density of perfection.
20  Thus, for example, an infinite world in which every   16 
cubic meter sub-region contains, say, ten starfish might be counted as more perfect than an 
infinite world in which every cubic meter sub-region contains five starfish, even if both 
contain an infinite number of starfish, and therefore an infinite amount of perfection.  
Likewise, assuming that primates are intrinsically more perfect than starfish, an infinite world 
in which every cubic meter sub-region contains ten primates would be counted as more 
perfect than an infinite world in which every cubic meter sub-region contains ten starfish, 
even though, again, both worlds might have an infinite total amount of perfection in virtue 
of containing infinitely many creatures.  On this way of determining relative perfection, the 
best of all possible worlds will be the infinite world with the highest “density” of perfection 
– the world that has the greatest amount of being “stuffed” into every finite sub-region.     
The second obstacle standing in the way of extending the strategy of Leibniz’s 
packing analogy to infinite extended worlds arises from the fact that it now seems plausible – 
if perhaps not quite inescapable
21 – that there should be a possible world containing every 
possible finite substance.  For, recherché subtleties aside, there should be no difficulty in 
finding a way to pack every finite extended substance into an infinitely extended creation.  If, 
for example, we imagine that each possible substance is analogous to a finite tile, it should be 
clear that there will be no difficulty in using every tile in “covering” an infinite two-
dimensional space.  The consequence that God should be able to create a world containing 
every possible finite substance, however, might be thought to constitute a fatal objection to 
Leibniz’s packing strategy for two distinguishable reasons.     
On the one hand, it might be thought that if there were a possible world containing 
every possible substance it would have to be identical to the best of all possible worlds (cf. 
A.VI.iii.581-82/DSR 105; A.VI.iv.1651/AG 29).  In the context of infinite worlds of 
extended substances, however, there is no reason to suppose that such a conclusion follows   17 
since there is no reason to suppose that the world containing every possible substance must 
have the highest density of perfection as measured above.  To see this more clearly, it might 
be helpful to think once again of possible substances as being analogous to tiles, but now 
with those tiles coming in two different colors.  If there are infinitely many black tiles and 
infinitely many white tiles, it should be possible to exhaustively tile even an infinite space 
using either all and only black tiles, or all and only white tiles, or all tiles black and white 
(following, say, a checkered pattern).  If it is assumed that black tiles are more densely 
perfect than white tiles, it will follow that the exclusively black tiling of the world will be the 
most perfect, the checkered tiling, representing the world containing every possible 
substance, will be less perfect, and the exclusively white tiling of the world the least perfect.  
If worlds are compared in terms of their relative density of perfection, the worry that a world 
containing every possible substance would have to be identical to the best of all possible 
worlds simply does not get off the ground.      
On the other hand, it might be thought that the very possibility of a world containing 
every possible substance would undermine Leibniz’s rejection of necessitariamism (cf. 
A.VI.iii.581-82/DSR 105; A.VI.iv.1663-64/AG 100; G III 573/L 662).  For it might be 
imagined that if all possible substances were compossible then all possible worlds would 
have to be compossible, and that if all possible worlds were compossible, then 
necessitarianism would become inevitable.  (If worlds are composed of substances, and all 
substances are compossible, how could any two worlds not themselves be compossible?)  
Again, however, in the context of infinite worlds of extended substances there is a rather 
straightforward reply to this worry.  For in such a context, there is no reason to suppose that 
the compossibility of all possible substances entails the compossibility of all possible 
worlds.
22  To see this more clearly, we might return once again to our analogy of the colored   18 
tiles.  Even granting the possibility of an exhaustive “checkered” tiling of the world 
containing every possible substance, it does not follow that all tilings of the world must be 
mutually compatible – indeed, the exhaustive all black, all white, and checkered tilings, for 
example, are all mutually incompatible.  Leibniz could thus admit the possibility of a world 
containing every possible substance without abandoning his commitment to the thesis of 
alternatives since such a world would be just one of many mutually incompossible worlds.   
Although a little tinkering is required, the move from finite extended worlds to 
infinite extended worlds does not appear to undermine in any substantial way the intuitive 
strategy of Leibniz’s packing analogy for addressing the puzzle of incompossibility.  Even 
allowing that possible worlds might be constituted by infinitely many extended corporeal 
substances, Leibniz may still insist that maximization is satisfied as long as God instantiates 
the most densely perfect infinite world – that is, the infinite world that would realize the 
most efficient packing of extended corporeal substances.  Such an understanding of creation 
is nonetheless still consistent with his commitment to the per se independence of created 
substances since it in no way presupposes the sort of formal dependence that is anathema to 
the traditional view of substance.  Finally, Leibniz’s commitment to alternatives remains 
unthreatened, since in choosing to realize one world in particular, God would nonetheless 
confront infinitely many different, mutually incompatible, possible worlds.   
 
4. Leibniz’s Packing Solution and Infinite Idealist Worlds 
 
Leibniz’s purported shift to an idealist metaphysics – to an ontology of unextended, 
incorporeal monads – places considerable further pressure on the strategy of his original 
packing analogy.  And in particular, it breathes new life into the two worries raised just   19 
above arising from the possibility of there being a possible world containing every possible 
substance.  The subsection that follows therefore takes up once again the worry that such a 
world would have to be identical to the best of all possible worlds, while the subsection 
following that reconsiders the threat of necessitarianism as it arises from the compossibility 
of all possible substances.  The two subsections taken together will suggest that both worries 
can indeed be met, but only at the cost of stretching Leibniz’s favored packing analogies to 
the limit and taking on board consequences that Leibniz himself seems clearly bent on 
rejecting.  The conclusion of the essay will suggest two possible lessons that might be drawn 
from the apparent tension between, on the one hand, Leibniz’s favored strategy for 
responding to the puzzle of incompossibility, and, on the one hand, his alleged embrace of a 
thoroughgoing idealism on the other.
23      
 
4.1. Must the Best World Contain Every Possible Substance? 
 
In light of his commitment to the per se independence of created substances, it seems that in 
an idealist setting Leibniz must once again grant that there is a possible world containing 
every possible substance.  And so we must ask once again if that world must be identical to 
the best of all possible worlds.   
Earlier we were able to answer negatively by arguing that in the context of his 
metaphysics of extended substances, it made sense to compare the relative perfection of 
infinite worlds by looking at how densely they were packed with being in every finite region, 
and noting that, on such a standard, there is no reason to suppose that the world containing 
every possible substance must be the best.  In the context of Leibniz’s purported idealism, 
however, that response is no longer adequate:  if substances are no longer extended spatially,   20 
it will no longer make sense to consider how densely they are packed.
24  For to the extent 
that the notion of density remains well-defined in such a context, all infinite worlds, it would 
seem, should be reckoned infinitely dense with perfection and thus all equally perfect.  Nor 
will the simple summation formula originally suggested by the finite packing analogy be of 
any help.  For that formula will still yield the result that all infinite worlds – all worlds 
containing infinitely many substances – should be infinitely, and thus equally, perfect.     
An answer to our question as to whether the best world must contain every possible 
substance thus turns out once again to presuppose an appropriate standard for determining 
the relative perfections of worlds.  And here we might take as a guiding idea the thought that 
one world is more perfect than another world just as long as it contains all of the other 
world’s perfections and the other world does not contain all of its perfections.  That is, W1 is 
better than W2, if W1 contains all the perfections of W2, but W2 does not contain all the 
perfections of W1.   
While such a notion will not provide us with a completely general rule for comparing 
any two worlds (since, prima facie, W1 might lack some perfections of W2, while W2 lacks 
some perfections of W1), it does suggest that our leading question must be answered 
affirmatively (that is, that the best world must indeed contain every possible substance).  For, 
assuming that all of a world’s perfections must ultimately be grounded in its constituent 
substances, it implies that if W1 contains all the substances of W2, and W2 does not contain 
all the substances of W1, then W1 must be more perfect than W2.  But from that it follows 
that if all possible substances are compossible then the best of all possible worlds must 
contain every possible substance.  For if the best of all possible worlds did not contain every 
possible substance, then there would be another world that contains all the substances of the 
best world and then some, and thus there would be a world that contains all the perfections   21 
of the best world and then some, and thus – per impossible – there would be a world better 
than the best of all possible worlds.  Given such a standard for comparing possible worlds, it 
thus seems inescapable that the best world must contain every possible substance, and, by 
implication, that the actual world must contain every possible substance.  
This is an initially surprising result that Leibniz – while he is not entirely unequivocal 
on the point – appears to reject solidly (see, e.g. NE III.vi.307; A VI.iv.1653-54/AG 94; but 
see also, G III 572/L 661).  Although we’ll return later to the question of what to make of 
Leibniz’s denial of what appears to be a fairly obvious consequence of his packing strategy, 
for now it may be most helpful to focus on the question of whether or not the consequence 
that the best of all possible worlds must contain every possible substance constitutes a fatal 
objection to the packing strategy as applied in the context of an idealist metaphysics.  A 
closer look at two worries that might be thought to flow from that consequence suggests 
that it does not.     
The first such worry, naturally, concerns the apparent ontological extravagance of 
supposing that the actual world must contain every possible substance.  If the actual world 
were to contain every possible substance, Leibniz might seem to be committed to the 
existence of (say) talking donkeys, doppelgangers, and what we would have thought were 
fictional characters.  Such a consequence, put frankly, might well seem simply absurd – too 
great a violation of metaphysical parsimony to be countenanced. 
It is tempting to respond to this worry by pointing out ways in which the ontological 
extravagance in question might be played down.  For one, it might be noted that the 
extravagance here is restricted to genuinely possible substances.  Leibniz thus needn’t, for 
example, allow that the actual world contains every possible chair, desk or laptop computer 
since such objects will not, for him, meet the demands required of substances.  Indeed, if   22 
Leibniz is read as a thoroughgoing idealist, the notion of substance would seem to be 
stringent enough to yield the result that the actual world contains no physical objects at all.  
Thus, although Leibniz’s embrace of the result that the actual world contains every possible 
substance would make his ontology very generous along one dimension, it would 
nonetheless still be quite austere along other dimensions.  For another, it might be noted 
that, if one reads Leibniz as a moderate essentialist – that is, as holding the view that created 
substances do not have all of their intrinsic properties essentially – the result that the actual 
world contains all possible substances will not entail the further consequence that the actual 
world contains all genuinely possible ways of being.
25  For consistent with a moderate 
essentialism, Leibniz could maintain that the best of all possible worlds must contain (say) 
Caesar, since he is a possible substance, but it needn’t realize the possibility of (say) Caesar’s 
willing to cross the Rubicon, or desiring unfettered power.  Each substance might, on such a 
reading, thus be thought of as like a determinable that might be created in infinitely many 
different determinate ways.  In creating the best of all possible worlds, God would be 
committed to creating all determinables, but not all determinates, and thus would be 
committed to realizing all possible substances, but not all possible ways of being.  Indeed, 
more strongly, since many of a substance’s ways of being will be mutually inconsistent – just 
as many determinates of a given determinable will be mutually inconsistent – God will be 
positively precluded from creating every possible way of being even while being morally 
constrained to create every possible substance.   
But while such maneuvers might go some distance towards salving contemporary 
scruples concerning ontological parsimony, it is far from clear that Leibniz would – or 
should – agree that there is really any difficulty here to begin with.  For, as has already been 
suggested, Leibniz’s metaphysics in general inclines towards ontological fecundity rather   23 
than parsimony, and, indeed, Leibniz himself explicitly embraces the view that there is a 
presumption in favor of something’s existing rather than not existing (A.VI.iii.472/DSR 21-
2).  Given his commitment to emphasizing the fullness and richness of creation, it is not 
clear why Leibniz, at least, should be especially troubled by the supposed ontological 
“extravagance” of the result that the actual world contains every genuinely possible 
substance.  The first worry, or apparent worry, thus does not, at the very least, appear to 
decisively undermine Leibniz’s packing strategy as applied in the context of an idealist 
metaphysics.       
A second worry, more serious from Leibniz’s perspective, concerns an apparent 
implication for divine justice that might seem to follow from the actual world’s containing 
every possible substance.  In a short piece that has appropriately enough been entitled My 
Principle is:  Whatever Can Exist and is Compatible with Others, Exists, Leibniz states the worry for 
himself:   
[I]t can be shown that not all things which are possible per se can exist together with 
other things.  For otherwise there will be . . . evil and miserable minds, and also 
injustices, and there would be no reason why God should be called good rather than 
evil, and just rather than unjust.  There could be some world in which all good 
people are punished with eternal penalties, and all evil people would be rewarded, 
and would expiate crime with happiness. . . . If all possibles were to exist . . . a God 
of the kind in whom the pious believe would not be possible.  (A.VI.iii.581-82/DSR 
105; cf. G IV 283-4/L 273) 
The deep difficulty highlighted in this passage is the thought that if God were to create every 
possible substance, he would thereby create, for example, virtuous people unjustly punished, 
and wicked people unjustly rewarded.  In that case, however, it would seem that any basis   24 
for calling God himself just would be undermined, unless one retreated to the view – which 
Leibniz explicitly rejects
26 – that God’s will determines what is just rather than what is just 
determining God’s will.  
  Although the worry here clearly plays a role in Leibniz’s own thinking about 
incompossibility, like its predecessor, it does not, I think, represent a fatal difficulty for his 
packing strategy as applied in an idealist context.  For either the notion of a possible creature 
essentially punished unjustly by God is incoherent, or it is not.  If, on the one hand, it is 
incoherent, the present worry presents no real difficulty for Leibniz.  For if one maintains – 
and I think this is Leibniz’s best option – that, for example, creatures are only inessentially 
punished by God, or that it is literally impossible for God to unjustly punish beings that owe 
their entire existence to him,
27 then the creation of every genuinely possible substance simply 
will not entail the consequence that God punishes some creatures unjustly.  If, on the other 
hand, the notion of a creature essentially punished unjustly by God is coherent, then the 
doctrine of the convertability of the good will entail that God should nonetheless instantiate 
such possible beings.  (And, indeed, the dark side of the doctrine of the convertability of the 
good has always been that, according to it, there is no genuinely possible existence so 
wretched, miserable, or unfair that is worse than not existing at all.
28)  If that is a non-
intuitive, or problematic consequence, it is, at any rate, a consequence not of Leibniz’s 
packing analogy – or even of the conclusion that God must create every possible substance – 
but rather of the traditional identification of goodness and being when taken together with 
the insistence that there are some creatures that can only exist if they are unjustly punished 
by God.  Thus the second worry, although it raises somewhat deeper issues for Leibniz and 
clearly plays a role in his thinking about the puzzle of incompossibility, does not, for all that,   25 
seem to represent a fatal objection to the packing strategy per se as applied in an idealist 
context.   
  It thus appears that Leibniz could have embraced the consequence that the best of 
all possible worlds contains every possible substance without doing any real damage to his 
larger philosophical system, and, in doing so, simply stared down one potential line of 
objection to extending his packing solution to a thoroughly idealist metaphysics.   
 
4.2.  Does the Compossibility of All Possible Substances Entail Necessitarianism? 
 
It was suggested above that, in the context of his metaphysics of extended corporeal 
substances, Leibniz could deny that the compossibility of all possible substances entails the 
compossibility of all possible worlds since the creation of one infinite collection of extended 
substances might physically preclude the creation of another infinite collection of extended 
substances.  The appeal to physical exclusion made in that argument, however, will of course 
no longer do in the context of a thoroughly idealist metaphysics.  And so we must ask once 
again, now in an idealist setting, if the compossibility of all possible substances entails the 
compossibility of all possible worlds.  And, to the extent that it does, whether the 
compossibility of all possible worlds entails necessitarianism.  
How one answers the first question – does the compossibility of all possible 
substances entail that all possible worlds are compossible? – will depend in part on whether 
one reads Leibniz as a moderate or strong essentialist.
29   
On a moderate essentialist reading, Leibniz could insist that while all possible 
substances are compossible, not all possible worlds are compossible on pain of God having 
to create a substance that is not identical to itself.  For, to return to our earlier example, on   26 
the moderate essentialist view, Caesar could will or not will to cross the Rubicon, desire or 
not desire unfettered power, and so on.  There should thus be, among all the possible 
worlds, a possible world in which Caesar wills to cross the Rubicon, and a possible world in 
which Caesar does not will to cross the Rubicon.  Are these two worlds compossible?  It 
seems that they must not be on pain of God creating something that both wills and does not 
will to cross the Rubicon, or, to put the same point in different terms, on pain of God 
creating Caesar not identical to himself.  On one understanding of Leibniz’s essentialism, he 
thus has a quick reply not only to the first question (does the compossibility of all possible 
substances entails the compossibility of all possible worlds) but also to its follow up:  given a 
moderate essentialism, not all possible worlds are compossible, and the apparent threat of 
necessitarianism doesn’t even arise (since God must still choose between many mutually 
incompatible worlds).    
On a strong reading of Leibniz’s essentialism – that is, on a reading according to 
which substances have all of their intrinsic properties essentially – how we answer the 
question “Does the compossibility of all possible substances entail that all possible worlds 
are compossible?” will turn on the further question of how one understands the 
individuation of created worlds.
30   
On one intuitive way of individuating created worlds – let’s call it the “parsimonious 
way” – a created world will be defined by the most inclusive set of created substances.  So, 
for example, if God were to create only three substances, say, Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey, 
he would be understood to have created only one world, namely, the world defined by the 
set {Caesar, Crassus, Pompey}.  If one individuates created worlds in this way, the 
incompossibility of possible worlds will follow trivially even given the compossibility of all 
possible substances.  To see this more clearly, consider two possible worlds W1 = {A, B}   27 
and W2 = {A} (where W1 might be, for example, the world containing every possible 
substance, and W2 the world containing every possible substance minus Caesar).  Are these 
two worlds compossible, that is, could God instantiate both of them together?  On a 
parsimonious way of individuating worlds, the answer must be no.  For if God were to 
create A and B, he would instantiate W1, but not W2.  If he were to create A alone he would 
instantiate W2 but not W1.  (And even if he were to create, in violation of the identity of 
indiscernibles A, B and A, he would still instantiate a distinct world, W3 = {A, B, A} and 
thus neither W1 nor W2.)  On a parsimonious way of individuating created worlds, the 
incompossibility of possible worlds falls out trivially even assuming the compossibility of all 
possible substances and a strong reading of Leibniz’s essentialism. 
On a perhaps less  intuitive way of individuating created worlds – let’s call it the 
“non-parsimonious way” – a created world might be defined by any subset of created 
substances.
31  On this way of individuating worlds, if God were to create only Caesar, 
Crassus, and Pompey, he could be understood to have created at least seven worlds defined 
by the sets {Caesar, Crassus, Pompey}, {Caesar, Crassus}, {Crassus, Pompey}, {Caesar, 
Pompey}, {Caesar}, {Crassus}, {Pompey}.  If one individuates created worlds in this way, 
the compossibility of all possible substances will indeed entail the compossibility of all 
possible worlds.  For on such a way of individuating created worlds, it will follow trivially 
that if God were to instantiate the world containing every possible substance, he would 
thereby also instantiate the world containing every possible substance minus Caesar, the 
world containing every possible substance minus Caesar and Crassus, etc.  Given a non-
parsimonious approach to individuating worlds, an affirmative answer to our first question 
(Does the compossibility of all possible substances entail the compossibility of all possible 
worlds?) must follow straightaway assuming a strong reading of Leibniz’s essentialism.   28 
Now, however, we must ask in earnest our second question:  does the compossibility 
of all possible worlds, counted in a non-parsimonious way, commit Leibniz to 
necessitarianism?  And the answer, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, is, I think, quite clearly, 
“no.”  For the relevant threat of necessitarianism is rooted in the idea that if God were to 
create every possible world, then there would be no sense in which he could have created 
otherwise – that he would be not just morally, but logically, locked into creating the actual 
world assuming that he creates at all.  But on the non-parsimonious way of individuating 
worlds, that conclusion does not follow since at the moment of creation God still confronts 
infinitely many metaphysically and morally distinct alternatives.  He could, for example, 
create all the possible worlds together constituted by all the possible substances, or, instead, 
he could create (only) all the possible worlds constituted by all the possible substances minus 
Caesar, or, instead again, all the possible worlds constituted by all the possible substances 
minus Caesar and Crassus, etc.  In short, even on a maximally permissive way of 
individuating possible worlds, the thesis of alternatives would still be preserved given that God 
is not logically required to create all possible substances and thereby all possible worlds.
32   
It thus appears that Leibniz could have embraced the consequence that the best of 
all possible worlds contains every possible substance and still avoided, by any of several 
different routes, the specter of a Spinozistic necessitarianism.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
In spite of the attention that has been devoted to developing the so-called logical and lawful 
approaches to the puzzle of incompossibilty, Leibniz’s packing strategy offers his most 
considered and most promising approach for fully addressing the difficulties that the puzzle   29 
presents.  That strategy is easiest to follow out in the simplified context of finite corporeal 
substance worlds where it is especially easy to see how the creation of one set of substances 
might preclude the existence of another set of substances without assuming that all of a 
world’s substances are formally co-dependent, or that God creates under the constraint of 
realizing some set or other of harmionous laws.  With a few relatively minor and intuitive 
adjustments, however, the strategy suggested by Leibniz’s packing analogies may also 
straightforwardly be applied in the context of an infinite metaphysics of extended corporeal 
substances.  In such a context, the assumption that there is no possible world containing 
every possible substance must be abandoned, but Leibniz could still insist that the best of all 
possible worlds needn’t contain every possible substance, and that the existence of one 
infinite world might physically preclude the existence of another infinite world.  Finally, with 
considerably more effort and strain, Leibniz’s packing strategy might even be applied in the 
context of a thoroughly idealist metaphysics of the sort that Leibniz is widely thought to 
have embraced in his mature writings.   
Having argued that Leibniz’s packing strategy provides him with the resources for 
solving the puzzle of incompossibility in both non-idealist and idealist contexts, it should 
nonetheless be granted that the move from the former to the latter stretches Leibniz’s 
favored analogies of arranged tiles and stacked stones to the breaking point.  Furthermore, it 
should be acknowledged that the move from worlds that include corporeal substances or 
extended bodies to worlds containing only mind-like monads raises some fairly obvious 
concerns that Leibniz shows no sign of solving, or even addressing, for himself.  In light of 
the persistence of his packing analogies – paradigmatic examples range from at least On the 
Secrets of the Sublime in 1676 to On the Radical Origination of Things in 1697 – this neglect on   30 
Leibniz’s part would seem to leave us with two very different possible pictures concerning 
the historical development of his thinking about the puzzle of incompossiblity.   
According to the first picture, Leibniz’s thinking about the puzzle is fixed in the 
context of his early metaphysics of extended corporeal substances, where it finds its most 
intuitive home, and is carried over, apparently without much reflection, to his later 
metaphysics of unextended incorporeal substances where it confronts new and difficult 
challenges that seem to have escaped his attention.  According to this picture Leibniz’s 
failure to retool his solution to the puzzle of incompossibility in order to fit the demands of 
a thoroughgoing idealism would be attributed to simple neglect – a not entirely implausible 
suggestion given the massive demands on Leibniz’s time especially towards the end of his 
career.    
According to the second picture, Leibniz’s thinking about the puzzle of 
incompossibility is still fixed in the context of his early metaphysics of extended corporeal 
substances, but goes unchanged because he continues to hold onto the possibility that the 
created world contains not only immaterial minds but also extended corporeal substances or 
bodies.  That is, Leibniz fails to reconsider the implications of his packing strategy because 
its metaphysical foundations remain largely unchanged relatively late into his career.  Insofar 
as it attributes to Leibniz a consistent, well-reasoned, even intuitive response to the puzzle of 
incompossibility, such a picture would seem to offer a more charitable understanding of his 
philosophical development, and might well provide a new line of attack for those 
commentators who see more than vestiges of extended corporeal substances or bodies in his 
“middle years” and beyond.
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1 Strictly speaking, possible worlds, for Leibniz, are concepts in the divine intellect and, as 
such, are as uncreated as God himself.  For ease of expression, however, I will sometimes 
speak of “God’s creating a possible world” by which I will mean “God’s bringing into 
existence a world in accordance with the concept of some possible world.”  I will similarly 
use the expression “God’s creating a possible substance” to mean more strictly “God’s 
creating a substance in accordance with a complete concept of a possible substance.”     
2 See, for example, A VI.iv.1384-5/AG 281-2; A VI.iv.1653/AG 94; and G VI 217-18/H 
234-36.  I will use the following abbreviations for Leibniz’s texts: A = Deutsche Akademie 
der Wissenschaften, ed., Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (Darmstadt and 
Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1923-), cited by series, volume, and page; AG = R. Ariew and D. 
Garber, ed. and trans., Philosophical Essays (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989); Alexander = H. G. 
Alexander, ed., The Leibniz-Clark Correspondence (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 
1956); DSR = G. H. R. Parkinson, ed. and trans., De Summa Rerum: Metaphysical Papers, 1675-
1676 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); G = C. I. Gerhardt, ed., Die Philosophische 
Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Berlin: Weidmann, 1875-90; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 
1960), cited by volume and page; H = E. M. Huggard, trans., Theodicy (LaSalle: Open Court, 
1985), reference is to section number; L = L. E. Loemker, ed. and trans., Philosophical Papers 
and Letters 2nd edition (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969); LDB = Brandon C. Look and Donald 
Rutherford, ed. and trans., The Leibniz-Des Bosses Correspondence (New Haven:  Yale University 
Press, 2007); LOC = R. T. W. Arthur, ed. and trans., The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings 
on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); RM = Mary 
Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson, ed. and trans., A Résumé of Metaphysics (London:  J M Dent 
and Sons Ltd, 1973), 145-147, cited by section number.  NE = P. Remnant and J. Bennett,   32 
                                                                                                                                                
ed and trans., New Essays on Human Understanding (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press 
1996) reference is to book, chapter, section.  I will also use the following abbreviations for 
Descartes’s works:  AT = C. Adam and P. Tannery, eds., Oeuvres des Descartes, 12 Volumes 
(Paris:  J. Vrin, 1964-76) reference to volume and page; CSM = J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, 
and D. Murdoch, eds. and trans., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volumes 1 and 2 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1985) reference is to volume and page.   
3 Thus, Leibniz: “. . . God is absolutely perfect – perfection being nothing but the magnitude of 
positive reality considered as such . . .” (G VI 614/AG 218), and “There exists, therefore, 
that which is the most perfect, since perfection is simply quantity of reality” (G VII 290/RM 
11).  For discussion and texts concerning the historical roots of the doctrine of the 
convertibility of the good, see Scott MacDonald, ed., Being and Goodness (Ithaca NY:  Cornell 
University Press, 1991).    
4 See, for example, Francisco Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae (Salamanca, 1957), Disputation 
XXXIII, Sections 1 and 3.  The notion that substances are per se independent has its roots, of 
course, in the Aristotelian tradition.  See, for example, Aristotle, Categories in Categories and De 
Interpretatione, trans., J. L. Ackrill (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1963), Chapter 5, 2
a10-13; and 
Metaphysics in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume II, trans., W. D. Ross (Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1984), Book V, Chapter 8; Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones 
disputatae, ed. Raymund M. Spiazzi (Rome:  Marietti, 1964-1965), Book III, Question 9, 
Article 1, contra.      
5 Jorge Gracia, “Glossary,” in Francisco Suarez,on Individuation, Metaphysical Disputation V:  
Individual Unity and Its Principle (Milwaukee, Wisconsin:  Marquette University Press, 1982), 
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6 What to say about the dependence of creatures upon God was a matter of somewhat 
greater controversy and complexity.  For two different approaches, see Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa contra Gentiles, trans. Anton C. Pegis et al. (Notre Dame, IN:  University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1975), Book I, Chapter 25; and Descartes, AT VIIIA 24/CSM 1:210 and AT 
VII 170/CSM 2:120.     
7 How each of these theses – including the “world-apart thesis” – is ultimately to be 
interpreted is, of course, a matter of considerable controversy.  For a stimulating entry point 
into the literature, see J. A. Cover and John O’Leary Hawthorne, Substance and Individuation in 
Leibniz (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1999).       
8 The distinction between “logical” and “lawful” approaches to the puzzle of 
incompossibility goes back to Fred D’Agostino, “Leibniz on Compossibility and Relational 
Predicates,” in Leibniz:  Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science, ed. Roger Woolhouse (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 1981), 89-103.  I, however, follow Margaret Wilson’s proposed 
terminology, opposing “logical” to “lawful” approaches, rather than D’Agostino’s which 
opposes “analytic” to “synthetic” approaches.  See, her “Compossibility and Law,” in 
Causation in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Steven Nadler (University Park:  Pennsylvania State 
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have to be miraculous, but mere “disharmony,” grounded in the natural unfolding of created 
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that God must create substances within the finite bounds of an independently existing space-
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efficient packing of the world.  Thus, for example, in an early piece, tentatively dated to 
1676, and entitled, On the Plentitude of the World, Leibniz writes, “A wonderful plenum of the 
kind that I expound is rational, even though it consists in nothing but spheres.  For there is 
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more densely packed than another.  Fortunately, for our purposes, the intuitive idea by itself 
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446.  Leibniz might therefore have found, for example, the suggestion that, even if there 
were only one possible world, God could choose to either create or not to create that world 
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(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2008), 71-93; and Jeffrey K. McDonough, 
“Leibniz on Optics and Contingency in Nature,” Perspectives on Science, forthcoming.     
33 I would like to thank Marcy Lascano, Alison Simmons, and three anonymous referees for 
this journal for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.  I would also like to 
thank audiences for helpful feedback at The Mid-West Seminar at the University of Chicago, 
The Margaret Wilson Memorial Conference at Cornell University, The Second Annual Conference of the 
North American Leibniz Society at Princeton University, as well as at meetings of the Society for 
Early Modern Philosophy at Yale University and the New York/New Jersey Consortium at 
John Jay College.  I owe further special thanks to Sam Levey for numerous discussions of 
the issues raised in this paper as well as for his many helpful suggestions for improving it.     